Introduction: globalization, Europe and territorial inequality
At the start of the twenty first century the 'new Europe' is characterised by significant and enduring territorial inequalities. Within Europe, and in parallel with debates in North America, concern over such disparities revolves around two main issues. First, there is a group of researchers who envisage the emergence of economies that are at one and the same time globalized and regionally integrated, and of a world in which sub-national regional economic life assumes increased significance in a global economy (Scott, 1998; Storper, 1998) . Second, there are those who offer a more sober analysis of contemporary trends, insisting on the way in which development is associated with a continued reproduction of inequality, and stressing the wide variation in the respective roles of global and local factors in shaping the trajectories of different regional economies (Dunford, 1994; Hudson and Williams, 1999) ..
The aim of this chapter is to provide an assessment of the dimensions of territorial inequalities in an increasingly integrated Europe, and to examine how we might understand the mosaic-like patterning of uneven development. In particular, the chapter critically engages with a debate in western European regional development which focuses our attention upon 'successful' experiences of regional transformation -what Lovering (1999) has called 'the new regionalism'. We argue that this focus does not enable us to explain the divergence and differentiation of territorial development in Europe. We also argue that the focus upon the putative conditions of 'success' in 'successful' regions limits the knowledges that we develop about regional economic performance in Europe.
To assess and explain the principal dimensions of European territorial inequalities we start with a discussion of the dimensions and trajectories of territorial disparities in the 'new Europe'. Second, we examine the limits of much of the existing literature on regional development in Europe. We suggest, following Lovering (1999) , that the 'new regionalist' orthodoxy fails to enable us to capture the variegated map of territorial inequality in Europe. We then point to some possible ways in which we might begin to reconceptualise regional dynamics in a more integrated Europe.
Globalization and regional transformations
One of the leading proponents of globalisation, Kenichi Ohmae (1995) , identifies three paramount tendencies in the global political economy that provide a starting point for us. The first is the growing and unstoppable dominance of transnational corporations (TNCs); the second is the increasing redundancy of the nation state; and the third is the emergence of regions as the major new sites for economic activity (cf. Scott, 1998) . Globalization, it is argued, is being driven by the unimpeded flow across national borders of the 'four I's -industry, investment, individuals and information. Investment is no longer geographically constrained. Industry is far more global in orientation with the strategies of modern multinationals no longer shaped or conditioned by reasons of state. Location is driven by the desire to access markets and/or resources, and subsidies have become irrelevant as location criteria.
Information technology now makes it possible for a company to operate in various parts of the world without having to build up an entire business system in each country and facilitates cross border participation and strategic alliances. Finally, individual consumers have become more global in orientation with better access to information about lifestyles around the globe. For Ohmae, the implications of this analysis are startling. The nation state is now seen as a meaningless territorial unit. In the now borderless economy, all meaningful operational autonomy should be ceded to what Ohmae calls 'region states'. These emergent regions tend to have between 5 million and 20 million people. Furthermore, the powerlessness of the nation state is taken to herald the death of Keynesian style state intervention. Indeed some analysts have gone further arguing that globalisation represents the greatest ever threat to the social democratic agenda (Richards, 1997) .
These claims have their echoes in Europe -one of Ohmae's emerging regional worlds of the global economy, itself made up of a mosaic of regional economies that others have baptised a Europe of the regions. Increasing integration and future enlargement of the European Union are seen as forces enhancing the position of Europe in the global economy. At the same time Europe is seen as comprising a series of territorial units of successful regional economies centred around areas such as the Third Italy and Baden Württemburg and economically strong, large metropolitan regions in the EU core (Dunford and Smith, 1998) . Such sub-national regions have been seen either as Marshallian industrial districts which owe their competitiveness and capacity for innovation to local clustering (Sabel 1994; Sengenberger 1993) or as diverse globalcity regions in which financial and producer-service functions dominate. Clustering, it is argued, allows for savings to be made by joint procurement and use of resources and by pooling labour, financial and physical capital and infrastructure. At the same time, there are, it is argued, strong relations of co-operation and trust which are vital to technological improvement. These districts or cities are also characterised by proactive regional strategies facilitated by the emergence of post Fordist flexible technologies and associated forms of firm and work organisation (Rhodes 1995) .
Agglomeration therefore privileges the local over the national in the global economy in 'regional worlds of production' (Storper AND SALAIS, 1999) or in 'networked learning regions' (Morgan 1997) . The result is a discursive rendering of sub-national regional success representing what Lovering (1999) has called a 'new regionalist' orthodoxy. The nation state in particular is seen to be receding in importance as the local and regional levels emerge as the motors of the global economy.
At the start of the twenty first century however the 'new Europe' is characterised by enormous and enduring territorial inequalities, and the focus in this literature upon 'success' only occurs through an overlooking of instances of relative failure and a preoccupation with selected parts of individual regional economies.
Just how wide are these inequalities? Using per capita income measured in purchasing power parities/standards (PPS) for 1996 relative to the European Union (EU) average, the wealthiest EU Member State, Luxembourg, was located at 168% of the average.
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The wealthiest central European state (Slovenia) was positioned at only 59% of the EU average and Russia (prior to the collapse of the rouble in 1998) was positioned at only 23% of the average (see Dunford and Smith, 2000) . The prospect of some of the countries of the former 'communist' world becoming future EU member states, therefore raises concerns over the cohesiveness of this 'new Europe'. As Iain Begg (1996: 13) has argued, the addition of approximately 105 million people in the ECE applicant countries would increase the EU population by 28%, while simultaneously adding only between 3.4 % and 8.5% to EU GDP (depending upon whether one uses nominal exchange rates or PPS estimates). Consequently, average EU per capita GDP would be likely to drop by around 15%. In other words, at current levels and under current criteria applied to EU Member States, all applicant countries would be eligible for Cohesion Fund support (less than 90% of EU GNP per capita) in addition to support through the Structural Fund programmes, costing something in the range of ECU 42 billion. Such transfers would account for between 7% of Slovenia's GDP and 51% of Lithuania's (Grabbe and Hughes, quoted in Begg, 1996: 12) .
The contemporary map of economic inequality in Europe that we shall discuss in more detail in the following section is, however, usefully situated within the twentieth century history of Europe and the wider world. Three historical considerations are important. The first is that wide territorial inequalities are a product of the last 200 years. In 1820 the distance between the richest and poorest countryin the world was of the order of 3 to 1. This ratio stood at about 11 to 1 in 1913 1 in , 35 to 1 in 1950 1 in , 44 to 1 in 1973 1 in and 72 to 1 in 1992 1 in (UNDP, 1999 . The second is that in Europe itself was also characterised by wide disparities of which the contrast in the late nineteenth century and at the turn of the twentieth century between an industrialised west and East-Central Europe and Russia in which capitalist relations were emerging during the 'first transition' (from late feudalism to emergent capitalist industrialisation) is particularly salient. At that stage territorial disparities in Europe (as in the world as a whole) were much lower than those found today: Russian per capita national product in 1870 stood at some 50% of the European average and that of the Hungarian kingdom stood at 73% (elaborated from Good, 1991: 228) .
2 What is significant, however, is that, as the economic historian Alexander Gerschenkron and others have taught us (Gerschenkron, 1962; Berend and Ránki, 1982 ; see also Dunford, 1998) (Dunford and Smith, 2000) . The various attempts to build and establish forms of capitalist and market relations in the former 'communist' world during the 'second transition' (since 1989) have therefore had enormously uneven impacts at both national and subnational scales (Smith, 1998; Dunford, 1998; Pickles and Smith, 1998 
Regional economic disparities in Europe
In addition to very significant territorial disparities between countries in the 'new Europe' there are also wide disparities in economic development between regions within EU and ECE countries. These differences are a factor standing in the way of greater cohesion in a more integrated Europe. Strict comparisons between ECE and the EU are not possible because of the different size of regional accounting units (the ECE countries are only beginning to implement a system of territorial organisation which enables comparisons to be made across diverse national contexts (see for example, recent GDP estimates for Slovak regions in comparison to the EU average (•ÚSR, 2000) ). However, it is possible to identify the scale of disparities in 1995 by using PPS estimates of regional per capita GDP relative to the EU average for NUTS III 5 regions in fifteen EU Member States and for the three ECE countries for which data are available (see Dunford and Smith, 2000 (Smith, 1998) . Another factor contributing to the high per capita wealth of Bratislava and other city regions is the role of significant net in-commuting so that large numbers of people who contribute to output do not reside in the area. As in most other ECE countries, there is also a large development divide between the capital city region and the rest of the country in Hungary and Slovakia (Smith, 1998) .
In Russia, no region lies above 75% of the average per capita income. The two wealthiest regions (Tyumen' in West Siberia (72% of the EU average) and the Sakha Republic in the Russian Far East (42%)) derive their status from major resource extraction industries -oil and gas in Tyumen' and diamonds in the Sakha Republicwhich together accounted for approximately 47% of Russia's exports in 1995 (Bradshaw et al., 1998: 160) .
At the opposite extreme, within the EU a significant number of German regions and Dunford and Smith, 2000) .
Convergence lasted until the mid-1970s when the post-war trend was reversed and divergence set in again. In 1989-92 the divergence trend intensified in Europe, largely as a result of the economic collapse of countries in ECE.
Underlying these post-war trends towards convergence are differences in the models of economic growth in different parts of Europe: a Keynesian or Fordist development model in Western Europe; and a model of state socialist industrialisation in ECE (see Smith (1998) Europe is doubtful. Analyses of the relative situation and of development tendencies in the two parts of Europe reinforce this conclusion. There are obvious and significant east-west technological gaps that will be difficult to close. More important, perhaps, is the evidence within ECE of a very profound process of sub-national regional uneven development. On the one hand capital accumulation is increasingly centred in core areas, such as capital city regions and western border areas (Smith, 1998; Dunford and Smith, 1998; Pavlínek, 1998) . On the other hand capitalist development strategies and marketisation are leading to the peripheralisation of more marginal regions that are increasingly 'left behind' (Smith, 2000) . While disparities in economic performance also characterized ECE under state socialism, the project of forced industrialization did have some effect on reducing sub-national territorial disparities (albeit it created rather unsustainable local economies often dominated by relatively few, large enterprises) (Smith, 1996 (Smith, , 1998 Bulgaria. Indeed, so marked are these differentials that they may well be recreating the 'old' European east-west division of labour and development divide that never fully disappeared in the post-war period.
Theoretical challenges: beyond 'the new regionalism'
While we have focused our attention thus far on the variegated map of uneven development in the 'new Europe' much of the existing theoretical work on territorial development has tended to focus upon those places and regions that are considered 'successful' regions in the global economy. This is what Lovering (1999) has termed the 'new regionalist' orthodoxy: a set of theoretical frameworks that concentrate upon success stories, rather than considering the political economy of divergent interests in 'successful' regions ('winners' and 'losers') and the broader mosaic of uneven development. We argue that the 'new regionalism' does not enable us to explain the divergence and differentiation of territorial development in Europe. Nor does it provide us with the policy tools from which to develop sensible scenarios for the 'emerging economies' of ECE. We argue, however, that the continual focus upon identifying the putative conditions of 'success' in 'successful' regional economies limits the knowledges that we develop about regional economic performance in Europe. Furthermore, such claims limit the scope for considering alternative scenarios other than those of 'new regionalism' for the economies of ECE.
Among the large body of research on regional development in Europe two main themes are identifiable. First, a significant amount of research has dealt with the role of firms in regional economic change. There are two main elements to this work. The first has focused on the role of large, externally owned manufacturing plants in regional development (see for example Dicken et al., 1994; Grabher, 1997; Turok, 1993; Young and Hood, 1995) . Focusing largely upon inward investment projects, this research has attempted to identify the conditions under which foreign-owned plants become the basis for the creation of 'embedded' regional development in which an upgrading of domestic supply networks occurs. The major concern of this research has been to examine the ways in which branch plant 'outposts' can become 'performance' plants and to assess the relative importance of sectors being locked into, or excluded from, the international and European economy through inward investment.
A second element of the role of firms in regional development has examined small and medium enterprises and endogenous development trajectories in industrial districts. Much of this work has concentrated upon explaining the seemingly enduring strength of localised agglomerations in an increasingly globalised and interconnected world (Storper, 1998) , and the respective roles of particular sectoral structures in promoting regional growth. It has been argued that dense networks of flexibly specialised inter-firm co-operation found in industrial districts help to explain the enduring role and 'success' of local agglomeration economies (Scott, 1988; Asheim, 1996) . However, a problem found in both of these bodies of work is their assumption that there is one best way (lean production, the learning firm, the learning region, etc) for restructuring to occur. We argue that the continuous restructuring of economic practices under capitalist social relations means that a variety of solutions underpin the real outcomes of regional and corporate organisation and linkages.
The research on the role of firms in regional development has also stimulated a second, more recent, area of work that has examined the governance of relations between firms and regional institutions. Storper (1998) This literature has therefore focused upon the governance of regional economies by institutions and the role of learning across institutional formations in promoting innovation and the strategic upgrading of local economies (Morgan, 1997; Maskell et al, 1998) . Arising from this work has been an argument that an explanation of regional success is rooted in the way in which local resources and institutions are mobilised to enhance competitiveness, trust and innovation (see also Humphrey and Schmitz, 1998 which has meant that the main union has had a 'separatist attitude towards other unions organising workers in this industry and more generally within the region' (Sadler and Thompson, 1999: 28) . Second, they argue that steel unionists have 'New regionalist' accounts of regional performance therefore confine themselves to putative 'success stories' of firms, sectors and/or regions. They fail to provide an indication of the relative importance of the firms, sectors and/or regions within the context of wider systemic processes of uneven development that underpin the variegated map of 'winners' and 'losers' in Europe. In this sense they fail to allow us to assess the mechanisms by which wealth is distributed across the territories of Europe and who gets access to that wealth. The reconfiguration of the regional economies of ECE after 1989 and the prospect for the future enlargement of the EU raise important issues over the extent of real convergence of economic outcomes and the determinants of overall regional economic performance, not addressed by these existing literatures. Consequently, this body of work also often implies that development programmes formulated in one time-space context can be transferred to other sites without considering the specificity of regional trajectories underpinning the identified 'success' (cf. Hudson, 1998) . Furthermore, the research on the role of firms in regional performance has tended to centre on a polarised debate over the relative merits of endogenous vis-à-vis exogenous factors in promoting development, rather than the relations between the two types of regional dynamics. Indeed, much of this debate has largely ignored parallel work in economic sociology, for example, that focuses upon the flows of value through commodity chains at various geographical scales and with variant structures of firm and regional governance (Gereffi 1994 , see also Smith et al 2000 . Much of this work on value chains, has shifted the focus from a debate over whether multinational corporations benefit or limit the capacity for local development to one in which various forms of firm organisation, with potentially divergent implications for the places in which firms are located, become the focus for analysis in tracing the dynamics of a chain of value. In this reading, there is no one best way (flexibility, learning, etc.) as is implied by much of the existing work on regional development. Finally, much of the embryonic research on industrial 'learning' also inadequately specifies the links between mechanisms of firm-level governance and change and the institutional contexts of regional development (Hudson, 1999) . By focusing upon the specifically regional dimensions of economic dynamism and institutional governance some of this work has a tendency to neglect the importance of national frameworks of economic governance in accounting for localised change (Gertler, 1997) .
Much of the focus of the 'new regionalism' has been on how to best transfer 'success' from one environment to another, which immediately raises issues of central importance for dealing with the divergence of regional economies in the 'new Europe'. For many writers, the emphasis is 'on building the wealth of regions (not the individual firm), with upgrading of the economic, institutional, and social base as the prerequisite for entrepreneurial success' (Amin, 1999: 370; see also Storper, 1998; Scott, 1998) . The wealth of regions can be built, it is argued, through a variety of mechanisms that might include the development of clusters of inter-related industries with long roots in a local skill or capabilities base to enhance international competitive advantage. Such clusters may be linked to the construction of economies of association by encouraging 'social dialogue and learning based on shared knowledge and information exchange', inter-firm exchange and reciprocity (Amin, 1999: 370-371) . Enhanced regional performance might also be achieved by learning to learn and adapt to changing external firm and sectoral environments and to predict and shape future trajectories of growth, and being able to evolve in order to adapt.
Also important is the broadening and mobilising of the local institutional base to enhance locally democratic and interactive associations between state and non-state actors to unlock local potentials. Finally, the creation of socially inclusive entrepreneurship and employment to nurture skills, expertise and capabilities rather than solely to increase the overall volume of jobs, is also seen as important. Together, then, such claims represent the basis for constructing alternatives to market- The first problem of 'new regionalism' is a rather pluralist analysis of the state which suggests that we are currently witnessing 'the internationalisation of the state' (see Burnham 1999) . This involves the internal and external restructuring of the state, rather than its destruction as in the more extreme forms of globalisation analysis.
There Furthermore, such an approach underplays the extent to which globalisation may be authored by states and be regarded by state agents (both liberal and social-democratic) as one of the most efficient means of restructuring labour-capital relations in a time of economic crisis.
Furthermore, Hudson (1998 Hudson ( , 1999 , for example, has warned against the uncritical embracing of a perspective based around localised learning and supply-side improvements. He argues that this understanding of the basis for enhanced regional performance and for transferring models to the environments of East-Central Europe has only been developed around a small set of largely West European examples (see also Hudson et al. 1997) . As Hudson (1999: 10) argues, learning 'is by no means a universal panacea to the problems of socio-spatial inequality and in some respects is used as a cloak behind which some of the harsher realities of capitalism can be hidden. Addressing the problems of uneven development and inequality ... poses very hard policy and political choices for those who seek to devise progressive development trajectories'. In particular, Hudson argues that, first, the production of knowledge and learning may be less important facets of corporate success than aspects of corporate practice such as rationalising and increasing the production efficiency of existing commodities or devising new commodities for profitable production.
Second, new forms of 'inclusive' work practices and management techniques based around re-skilling and team work may be less significant than an intensification of the labour process under contemporary capitalism. He argues that '[w]orkers are enmeshed within disempowering regimes of subordination, characterised by control, exploitation, and surveillance, accepting arrangements through which they discipline themselves and their fellow workers, while bound together through the rhetoric of team working' (Hudson, 1999: 7) . This has clearly been the case in the context of the new work practices implemented in many foreign investment projects throughout ECE (Pavlínek and Smith, 1998; Hardy, 1998) .
Third, new work practices are increasingly concerned with no-union and one-union agreements and so the basis for inclusion and negotiation of democratic work places is eroded further. Fourth, the proposed role for increased network relations between firms may be less based upon equal exchange and reciprocity than upon 'sharp asymmetries in power between companies, and ... subtle coercion if companies wish to keep their customers or suppliers' (Hudson, 1999: 8) . Finally, 'institutional thickness' and dense mosaics of state and non-state interaction may be no guarantee for long-term innovation, learning and competitiveness as institutional lock-in can also constrain change (see also Smith and Swain, 1998 for a discussion of the ECE experience of lock-in).
To what extent then is there a potential for the implementation and development of such 'wealth of regions' policies in an increasingly inter-dependent European economy? We would suggest that the scope is limited for three main reasons. First, there are limits to the extent to which one of the major forces for regional economic restructuring in 'the new Europe', inward direct investment, can provide the basis for the enhanced wealth of regions. The corporate strategies of multinational companies investing in East-Central Europe are invariably not conducive to the enhancing of regional economic performance. Strategies tend to capitalise on the low wage, low cost locational advantages of the region and upon gaining access to new markets (Hardy, 1998; Pavlínek and Smith, 1998) . It therefore seems unlikely that the significant development divide between east and west in Europe will be overcome by enhancing the role western corporations in the region.
Second, regional capacities within East-Central Europe have been starkly eroded as a result of two main processes. The first has been the deindustrialisation of large parts of the region in the early 1990s (Smith, 1998 , Dunford, 1998 and the second has been the continued adherence to neo-liberal policies and macroeconomic prudence under a regime of global governance (Gowan, 1995; Smith, 1997 Smith, , 1998 . The latter in particular has constrained the options that are open to policy makers in the region.
Third, the regional institutional structures of East-Central Europe under state socialism could be characterised as 'thin' and this legacy remains an important impediment to enhancing regional performance. This was true in both the state and non-state sectors. In the state sector there are few actors to build on, aside from those attached to the former hegemony of the Communist Party. In the non-state sector there were few firms with limited subcontracting linkages between them, a stress upon local autarky (although see the case of VW-•koda in the Czech Republic (Pavlínek 1998, Pavlínek and Smith 1998) ) and outside of the enterprise sphere, little basis for enhancing civic involvement and 'local voice' as has been seen to be important in areas of growth such as those in parts of Italy.
Overall, we argue that the existing work on 'the new regionalism' largely fails to provide us with the conceptual tools necessary to understand the changing divisions of labour across space and differentiation of regional economies in an increasingly integrated Europe. Indeed, it is the changing functional and sectoral patterning of the geography of economic activities that we would argue is fundamental to understanding the performance of regional economies. Relating this geography of economic activities to mechanisms of wealth creation and (re)distribution perhaps provides us with a better handle on the variegated map of uneven development in Europe. However, such a focus on the geography of these activities is only a way in to thinking about inequalities in the creation and appropriation of value and the (unequal) flows of value between places that underpin the mosaic of regional inequality in Europe (see for instance Smith et al, 2000) . An understanding of the production and flow of value associated with different forms of economic activities in different locales may well provide a key starting point to understanding the 'production' of uneven development in 'the new Europe'. For example, Gereffi (1994) has argued that commodity or (what we would call) value chains have three main dimensions. First, commodity chains have a specific input-output structure that links various nodes of production, distribution and consumption into a chain of economic activity through which value-added is produced. Second, commodity chains have a territoriality in the sense that the various activities, nodes and flows within a chain are geographically situated, with implications for levels and processes of development depending upon where a locale is within a chain. Within Europe, while being a thoroughly internationalised space-economy, there is scope for understanding the extension of value chains across European territory after 1989. Finally, commodity chains have a structure of governance that Gereffi (1994: 97) defines as 'authority and power relationships that determine how financial, material, and human resources are allocated and flow within a chain.' Such a perspective may provide the basis for a better understanding of the geographies of power and control across different sites (locations, territories) within chains of commodity and value producing systems, than an approach based around forms of largely localised associationalism.
While associationist approaches stress the importance of developing democratically formed local systems of governance, issues of power and control within and across space are largely neglected (Allen et al, 1998) .
Conclusions
At the start of the twenty first century, then, regional economies in Europe are faced with a momentous task. The collapse of state socialism revealed the enormous disparities between territorial economies within East-Central Europe and in comparison with the EU at both the national and sub-national scales. The implementation of transition policies in East-Central Europe has also in many ways further eroded the economic capacities of these territories. Furthermore, within the EU, while there have been some notable successes, significant territorial disparities remain. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that within Member States the divide between rich and poor territories has been growing over the last decade. What remains, then, is a set of challenges to analysts of territorial development that take two main forms. First, we need to grapple with frameworks that enable us to understand the enormously variegated map of uneven development in Europe. Whether we can rely upon models and frameworks that have been developed around the putative success stories of industrial districts and learning economies from Western Europe, when those models themselves are challenged within the west (Lovering, 1999) , is a crucial issue. Second, we need to bring together approaches that adequately deal with economic performance and the governance mechanisms that underpin different territorial outcomes. One such approach might be derived from an understanding of territorial divisions of labour resulting from flows of value across chains of economic activities located in different territories Gereffi, 1994) .
Governance is a crucial part of such a framework, and what governs these flows of value are the mechanisms of organisation within the chains: buyers or suppliers, capital or labour. Such a perspective raises immediately the question of power within governance: who controls and who wins and loses (see Allen et al, 1998: 132-135) . In understanding the nature of territorial uneven development within 'the new Europe' such a focus on differential relations of power has to be a central starting point.
